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It is well known that libertarians like Nozick believe the separateness of persons supports 
deontological side constraints. According to side constraints, we are never allowed to commit 
certain rights violations, even if doing so would prevent several similar rights violations. 
Nozick’s reason for this alleged supporting relationship is that the one rights violation is not 
like a sacrifice that a social mass entity undergoes in order to maximize its own good. The 
wording of Nozick’s reason sounds remarkably similar to John Taurek’s argument according 
to which we never have reason to rescue the greater number--not even if doing so can be 
accomplished without committing a rights violation on the way. If we could either rescue one 
person or several persons from drowning, Taurek would suggest tossing a coin. Does the 
libertarian argument in favour of side constraints entail Taurek’s view? Or can libertarians 
maintain that the separateness of persons speaks in favour of the more moderate constraint 
according to which we should only avoid maximizing outcomes when doing so actually 
involves a rights violation?  
For Nozick, the separateness of persons supports the idea that utilitarianism needs to 
be fixed with deontological side constraints. He distinguishes between an end goal structure 
and a side constraint structure of individual rights. If the rights protection is an end goal, then 
this could give reason to violate that very right if by doing so more extensive violations of the 
same right could be prevented. If one could prevent the killing of five people by killing a 
single person, the end goal structure would recommend doing so. This, so the argument goes, 
is to be avoided. Hence, rights protection should have the structure of side constraints, which 
forbid the violation of the right as a means to any end goal, including the goal of protecting 
the identical rights of a larger number of persons.1  
At this point utilitarians will obviously object that one might respect the separateness 
of persons more, by protecting more persons from rights infringements. Nozick answers this 
utilitarian challenge with his appeal to the separateness of persons: “… there is no social 
entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual 
people, different individual people, with their own individual lives.”2 
                                                
1 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 26-33, 48. 
2 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 32-33. 
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This passage displays striking similarities with passages by John Taurek who also 
seeks to defend a deontological constraint by appeal to the separateness of persons. In his very 
similar wording the alleged role of the separateness of persons is even more explicit. He 
writes: “This [the deontological thesis] reflects a refusal to take seriously in these situations 
any notion of the sum of two persons’ separate losses.”3 A page later he adds the following 
thought about the possibility of ignoring side constraints: “I do not see that I can thereby spare 
a single person any greater pain.”4 Taurek’s idea seems to be that there is no single entity or 
person that will suffer the disadvantages. This allegedly means that we ought not to look at 
the aggregated amount of suffering. Separateness is supposed to speak against adding. In this 
sense, Taurek’s interpretation of the appeal to separateness is a negative argument against 
views that support adding.  
However, it is not clear that libertarians and other deontologists want to be against 
adding in literally all cases. If we could either rescue one person or rescue five, in both cases 
without violating anybody’s rights, most deontologists would presumably want to say that it is 
better to rescue the five. Being against adding in all cases means that we have to be indifferent 
when confronted with this choice. Taurek’s use of the “social entity” as implying that we 
should not add up in any cases is a rather extreme position: He suggests tossing a coin in these 
cases. Most deontologists will want to say something more moderate: We should avoid 
adding up only in cases in which rescuing the five would require violating someone’s rights, 
for example by requiring us to actively kill the one. If nobody’s rights are at stake and we 
have to decide whether to help one or a group of five, we should help the five. 
Can the separateness of persons speak in favour of the more moderate deontological 
position? Obviously, the claim that the separateness of persons speaks against adding in all 
cases is not able to establish the connection with the moderate position, because this claim 
will lead to the extreme position held by Taurek. If Nozick wants to hold the more plausible 
moderate deontological position he needs to argue that we should avoid adding only if this 
would require an impermissible use of another person by ourselves, as in the case of killing 
one to rescue five.  
The emphasis on the impermissible active killing of the one in this formulation of side 
constraints seems to direct our attention at actions in addition to separateness. Now we have 
to ask how a supporting relationship between separateness and actions could get fleshed out. 
For one thing, we first have to specify that the supporting relationship would have to run from 
the separateness of persons to my actions, rather than to actions in general. Otherwise, we 
                                                
3 Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?” p. 308 
4 Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?” p. 309. 
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would be back to where we started. We would face the question whether it might not be 
irrational to reduce the total number of mortal actions if we can do so by committing one 
mortal action. The supporting relationship would have to run from separateness to a 
prohibition of my mortal actions.  
The idea might be that we have to view the separateness of persons from an 
“egocentric perspective”. The proposal could then run as follows. I have some sort of 
priviledged first-personal relationship with myself and am the author of my own actions in a 
way in which I can never be the author of other people’s actions. As a result I am particularly 
responsible for my own actions. We may stick to some general terminology and call this 
perspective agent-centered. If this is our perspective on separateness, then the moderate side-
constraint view might indeed follow. Saving the larger number would be impermissible 
whenever it would require that I actively commit an illegitimate act. 
This is an interesting result. It is interesting because it seems to be in conflict with the 
way in which Nozick’s view is generally categorized.5 According to the general view, 
libertarians like Nozick hold a patient-centered, rather than an agent-centered deontological 
view. The patient-centered view demands that nobody should be treated in an impermissible 
way and that it is impermissible to treat persons as a mere means to one’s own ends. The 
agent-centered view, on the other hand, focuses on our capacity as agents and says our 
primary duty consists in “keeping our own moral house in order” by never committing an 
impermissible act.  
When trying to construct an argument in favour of moderate deontological side 
constraints, it turns out that the patient-centered view alone does not yield the desired result. 
The patient-centered view alone only gives us reason to avoid the use of persons as mere 
means. Of course our killing the one in order to rescue the five would imply using him as a 
means for rescuing the others. But in a relevant sense the rights violations against the five will 
be exactly the same: Someone will use them as a mere means by killing them. Since the 
patient-centered view on its own only gives us reason to avoid the use of persons as mere 
means, it might well demand that we ought to avoid uses as mere means of the larger number. 
The one way of avoiding this, that we have seen so far, would be to follow Taurek’s 
interpretation of the appeal to separateness as demanding a refusal to add in all cases, because 
there is no social entity that will enjoy the aggregated benefit of the outcome. But this will 
lead to the extreme position that we should avoid adding even in cases in which no rights 
violation on our part is involved.  
                                                
5 Scheffler, Consequentialism and Its Critics; Kamm, Intricate Ethics. 
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In the end, I argue that libertarians have two options, each of them with a 
disadvantage: 
On the one hand, they can argue that the separateness of agents and the separateness of 
victims matter equally and lend positive support to a concern for one’s own actions and for 
the situation of victims in general. In order to generate a decision between the two attitudes, 
they can then hold that the separateness of persons also supports the argument against adding. 
Taken together this view will yield the desired result with regard to side constraints. The 
disadvantage is that the view will speak against adding in all cases, because we lack an 
argument that restricts the prohibition against adding to cases involving rights violations and 
that can itself be derived from the separateness of persons. This means that the view would 
turn out to be more extreme than libertarians might have wanted. 
Alternatively, they can solve this problem by arguing the separateness of agents 
matters more than the separateness of victims. This will yield the more popular moderate 
view that we should never commit a rights violation ourselves, but that we may or should be 
concerned about the greater number whenever doing so does not require us to commit a rights 
violation. The disadvantage of this view is that there seems to be no argument for why the 
separateness of agents should matter more that derives itself support from the separateness of 
persons. The separateness of persons seems to lend equal support to the agent-centered and 
the victim-centered interpretation of deontological constraints. This second option would 
therefore require libertarians to give weight to the agent-centered view over-proportionally to 
what the separateness of persons seems to support.  
 
 
